We present a theory which describes a recently introduced model of an evolving, adaptive system in which agents compete to be in the minority. The agents themselves are able to evolve their strategies over time in an attempt to improve their performance. The present theory explicitly demonstrates the self-interaction, or market impact that agents in such systems experience.
I. INTRODUCTION
Agent-based models of complex adaptive systems (CAS) provide invaluable insight into the highly non-trivial global behaviour of a population of competing agents [1] . These models typically involve agents with similar capability competing for a limited resource. The agents are given the same global information, which is in turn generated by the action of the agents themselves, and they learn from past experience. The growing field of econophysics [2] [3] [4] represents an area in which such CAS may be applicable: every agent knows the past ups and downs in the index of a stock market and must decide how to trade based on this global information. An important step forward in agent-based models of CAS was made by Challet and Zhang [5, 6] who proposed the so-called Minority Game (MG) in which an odd number N of agents successively compete to be in the minority. Each agent is randomly assigned a limited number of strategies at the beginning of the game, hence introducing some quenched disorder. As the game progresses, non-trivial fluctuations arise in the collective agents' decisions -these can be understood in terms of the dynamical formation of crowds consisting of agents using correlated strategies, and anticrowds consisting of agents using the anticorrelated strategies [7] . Subsequent work by Challet and co-workers has provided a remarkable formal connection to spin glass systems [8] .
The basic minority game, however, does not incorporate evolution. Agents are stuck with their initial strategies and hence the system cannot avoid this in-built frustration. In the real world, one would expect that agents would be able to evolve more successful strategies, or at least stop playing disasterous strategies. This motivated us to recently propose a simpler minority model which allowed for an evolving population [9-11] -we call this the evolutionary minority game (EMG). D'Hulst and Rodgers [12] subsequently proposed an analytic theory, based on a slightly modified version of our model. However, the two models actually give different numerical results [11] .
Here we provide a theory for our evolutionary minority game (EMG) [9] which correctly includes the self-interaction of the agents. Results are in good agreement with numerical data. The plan of the paper is as follows. We introduce the EMG in Sec.II and give the main features observed in numerical simulations of the model. In Sec.III, we present the formalism and derive the winning probability for an agent. Results from the present theory are compared with numerical data in Sec.IV. Section V provides a discussion of the results.
II. EVOLUTIONARY MINORITY GAME
Consider an odd number N of agents repeatedly choosing to be in room 0 (e.g. sell) or room 1 (e.g. buy). After each agent has independently chosen a room, the winners are those in the minority room. A single binary digit denoting the minority room forms the outcome for each time-step. Each agent is given the information of the most recent m outcomes. Each agent also has access to a common register or "memory" containing the outcomes from the Faced with a given bit string of length m, it seems reasonable for an agent to simply predict the same outcome as that registered in the memory. The agent will hence choose room 1 following the next 000 sequence. If 0 turns out to be the winning room, the entry (000)1 in the memory is then updated to be (000)0. Simply put, each agent looks into the most recent history for the same pattern of m bit string and predicts the outcome using the history. In effect, each agent holds one strategy and all agents hold the same strategy, with the strategy being dynamical. The strategy is hence to follow the trend. However, if all N agents act in the same way, they will all lose. A successful agent is one who can follow a trend as long as it is valid and to correctly predict when it will end. To incorporate this factor into our model, each agent is assigned a single number p, which we refer to as the "gene"-value. Following a given m-bit sequence, p is the probability that the agent will choose the same outcome as that stored in the memory, i.e. he will follow the current predictor. An agent will reject the prediction and choose the opposite action with probability 1 − p. To incorporate evolution into our model, we assign +1 (−1) point to every agent in the minority (majority) room at each time step. If an agent's score falls below a value d (d < 0), his gene-value p is modified.
The new p value is chosen randomly from a range of values centered on the old p with a width equal to R. We impose reflective boundary condition to ensure that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Our conclusions do not depend on the particular choice of boundary conditions. For R = 0, the agents will never change their gene values -this represents the limiting case of in-built quenched disorder determined by the initial distribution of p values. For any non-zero R value, the system is able to evolve through gene modification. For R = 2, the new gene value is uncorrelated with the old one upon modification.
Initially, each agent is randomly assigned a gene value in the range 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Choosing R = 0 allows the population to evolve. We focus on two quantities, P (p) and L(p), in the Figure 1 also shows that there is no explicit dependence on m for P (p) and L(p) [9, 11, 13] . The independence on m of the results was also discussed recently by Burgos and Ceva [13] using a random walk argument. Reference [12] proposes a theory which gives a P (p) somewhat similar to that shown in Fig.1 . However, the theory was developed based on a model in which each agent is initially assigned one strategy from the strategy pool, and uses this strategy throughout the game: the corresponding P (p) is then m-dependent [11] in contrast to the EMG results shown in Fig.1 . The dependences on the other parameters of the EMG such as N, d, and R are reported in Ref. [11] .
III. FORMALISM
We consider a game with N agents (N ≫ 1). After a sufficiently long time, the distributions P (p) and L(p) reach the stationary forms as shown in Fig. 1 . Consider a certain moment of the game in this steady-state regime. Let the predictor, which is simply the strategy stored in the memory for the given history bit-string, be 1; i.e. go to room "1". As long as the winning room is defined as the minority room, i.e. with a cutoff at (N − 1)/2, the following arguments do not depend on the actual value of the predictor and hence also hold if the predictor says 0. We define F N (n) as the probability of the attendance being n in the predicted room. It follows from the central limit theorem that F N (n) will be an approximately gaussian distribution with a mean Np and variance N 1 0 P (p)p(1 − p)dp. Here p is the mean of the gene value p given by p = 1 0 pP (p)dp, which is known if the distribution P (p) is known. However, P (p) is the unknown which we are going to solve for. In the steady state, F N (n) becomes identical to the probability of the attendance in any one of the two rooms since the two possible outcomes occur equally often on average. Figure 2 shows the normalized F N (n) in the steady state extracted from the numerical simulations.
In the spirit of self-consistent mean-field theories, the basic idea of the present formulation is to consider the interaction between a particular agent and the rest of the population. We present the formulation in a general way so that it can be readily generalized to different variations of our model. We consider the action of a particular agent, say the k-th player, in the background of the N − 1 other agents. Let G k N −1 (n) be the probability of the attendance being n in the predicted room, given that there are only (N − 1) agents participating in the game (i.e. excluding the k-th agent). Then F N (n) can be written in terms of
where n = 0, N. Here p k is the p-value of the k-th agent at that moment. The physical meaning of Eq. (1) is transparent. An attendance of n in room "1" is achieved if the attendance by the (N − 1) agent background is n − 1 and the k-th agent decides to go to room "1": this leads to the first term in Eq.(1). Alternatively the attendance by the (N − 1) agent background is n and the k-th agent decides not to go to room "1": this leads to the second term in Eq.(1).
Let τ (p k ) be the winning probability of the k-th agent. Given the probability G k N −1 (n), we can write
Equation (2) says that the k-th agent wins if (i) the attendance is below (N − 3)/2 in room "1" before he makes his move and he decides to go to room "1", thereby giving the first term or (ii) the attendance is above (N + 1)/2 in room "1" before he makes his move and he decides not to go to room "1", thereby giving the second term. Since the k-th agent is only characterized by his gene value p k , τ (p k ) can also be interpreted as the success rate of an agent using gene value p k . It follows from Eq.(1) that
Since
, which follows from the consideration that room "1" is empty only if the other N − 1 agents do not go to room "1" and the k-th agent does not go to room "1", we have
Similarly, we have from Eq.(1)
, which follows from the consideration that all the agents go to room "1" only if all the other N − 1 agents go to room "1" and the k-th agent goes to room "1", we have
Substituting Eqs. (3) and (4) into Eq. (2), we obtain
) and F N (
), we then obtain
Equation (5) separates τ (p k ) into 3 terms, each of which has a physically transparent interpretation. Consider an "outsider", i.e. someone whose action does not affect the outcome but instead is only betting on which side is the winning room according to the probability p k .
His winning probability is given by the first two terms in Eq.(5). The third term gives the difference in the winning probability between an "outsider" of the game and an agent who actually participates in the game. This term is negative, reflecting the fact that an agent has a smaller probability of winning when he is actually participating in the game. Consider the case in which the background population is split evenly between room "0" and room "1": the k-th agent loses no matter what action he takes. Thus the third term represents this self-interaction term, or so-called market impact in financial market terminology. The p k (1 − p k ) factor means that the winning probability increases as the gene value p k deviates more from the value 1/2, and it produces a symmetry about p = 1/2 in L(p) and P (p) as shown in Fig.1 . Note that Eq.(5) also applies to the case when the predictor says 0: hence it is independent of the dynamics of the predictor which in turn is determined by the time evolution of the outcomes. This further implies that the resulting P (p) and L(p) do not depend on the value of m in the model. For the present EMG, there is a lack of an a priori perferred room: therefore the outcomes 0 and 1 will occur similar numbers of times on the average. In this case, the summations in the first and second terms of Eq. (5) in the steady state yield the value 1/2 and hence τ (p) becomes
In order to express the right hand side of Eq. (5) ). From Eq. (1), we have
Subtracting the equations obtained by multiplying Eq. (1) by (1−p k ) and multiplying Eq. (7) by p k , we can eliminate
Repeatedly applying Eq. (1), we can eliminate
Similarly, if we apply Eq. (1) with increasing values of n instead of decreasing values of n, we obtain
Although the results are exact, in practice it makes sense to use Eq. and substituting the result into Eq. (5), we obtain τ (p k ) entirely in terms of F N (n), and the label k becomes irrelevant. As mentioned, τ (p k ) can be regarded as the winning probability of an agent who is using a gene value p, and henceforth we denote it by τ (p) for simplicity.
IV. RESULTS
In order to obtain P (p) from τ (p), we note that these two quantities are related. In Ref.
[12], it was pointed out that the stationary distributions P (p) and L(p) are proportional to each other:
where the right hand side is a constant independent of p. Equation (10) follows from the balance between the fluxes of agents into and out of a region in p-space in the steady state.
Since an agent using the gene value p loses (1 − 2τ (p)) points each turn [12] , the lifespan
.
From Eq.(10), we have
with the proportionality constant determined by the normalization of P (p) to 1 0 P (p)dp = 1.
Based on the present theory, it is straightforward to construct an iterative calculation scheme for P (p). The steps are the following: (a) assume a form for
by evaluating p and the standard deviation from the assumed P (p), (c) use Eq. (5) together with Eqs. (8) and (9) to obtain τ (p), (d) calculate P (p) from τ (p) using Eq. (11) ) given in Ref. [12] gives a very small τ (p) for a significant range of p around p = 1/2 corresponding to the plateau in P (p). Figure 5 suggests that the correct τ (p) in the steady state, which follows from Eq.(5) (see also Eq. (6)), has the form
is an N-dependent constant which decreases with N as 1/ √ N . Such a scaling with N makes sense from random walk arguments.
V. DISCUSSION
We have presented a theory of the EMG based on the consideration of a particular agent in the environment formed by the rest of the population. The winning probability τ (p) is given in terms of the population distribution in one of the rooms. By relating the population distribution, the winning probability and the lifespan, an iteration scheme is set up for calculating the frequency distribution of gene values P (p). Results for P (p), L(p) and τ (p) are in good agreement with numerical data.
The present formalism can be used to describe different versions of the EMG. For example, a generalization of the EMG was recently introduced where the winning 'room' (i.e.
winning decision) was assigned according to whether the attendance was lower than a certain cutoff [14] . For this case, one can modify the limits in the summations in Eq. (2) and carry out the calculations accordingly. We emphasize that Eq. (5) is applicable even if the steady state P (p) is not symmetric about p = 1/2. An interesting feature in this generalized EMG model is that when the cutoff percentage deviates significantly from 1/2 and becomes smaller (or larger) than a critical value, the steady state P (p) takes on a form which depends on the initial distribution of p. In particular, the population distribution P (p) freezes -no further modification of gene values arises as time evolves for large (or small) enough value of the cutoff. This phenomenon is discussed in more detail in Ref. [14] . Another generalization is to modify the way in which the p-value is updated [15] . Future work will focus on application of the present theoretical approach to such generalizations of the simple minority game set-up. 
